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Case No. 940241-CA 
Priority No. 2 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
0000O0000 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRANT K. STRAUSBURG, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
0000O0000 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the court pursuant to Rule 
26(2) (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (d) (Supp. 1994), whereby a defendant in a circuit 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the court of appeals 
from a final order on a misdemeanor offense. In this case the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge, Third Circuit Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Murray Department, rendered final 
judgment and conviction for the offenses of DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44, and LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN INJURY ACCIDENT, 
a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-29. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are attached as addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-29. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in admitting scientific HGN 
test results without proper foundation as required by Rule 702, or 
a finding of inherent reliability? 
2. Did the trial court err in admitting statements of 
defendant taken without benefit of Miranda warnings? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
An appellate court reviews the admissibility of evidence under 
a correction of error standard. In reviewing the admissibility of 
scientific evidence a reviewing court must determine if the 
scientific test meets the Utah standard of inherent reliability. 
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 397 (Utah 1989). In determining 
if scientific evidence is admissible, the reviewing court must find 
that "the scientific principles or techniques have been properly 
applied to the facts of the particular case by qualified persons 
and that the testimony is founded on that work." Xd. at 398, n. 7. 
The "ultimate question" of whether a confession was obtained 
legally is a question of law which this Court reviews for 
correctness. See generally State v. Miller, 829 P. 2d 132 (Utah App. 
1992). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Mr. Strausburg appeals his conviction for Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol Causing an Injury Accident on the grounds that 
the arresting officer was not qualified to validate the scientific 
principles supporting the relationship between alcohol ingestion 
and nystagmus, that recent scientific literature demonstrate the 
unreliable nature of HGN evidence; and that admission of the HGN 
result in this case was reversible error. A motion to suppress 
the results of the HGN test was filed with the Third Circuit Court, 
Murray Department, on March 2, 1994. The Honorable James S. Sawaya 
heard argument in chambers before trial on March 3, 1994. The 
defense motion to suppress results of the HGN test was denied. 
The defendant also appeals his convictions for Driving Under 
the Influence Causing an Injury Accident and Leaving the Scene of 
an Injury Accident because the officer illegally obtained a 
confession from Mr. Strausburg without first giving him Miranda 
warnings. 
FACTS 
On March 4, 1994, a jury found Mr. Strausburg guilty of two 
charges: (1) Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol Causing an 
Injury Accident (hereinafter "DUI") in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44 (1953 as amended}; and (2) Leaving the Scene of an Injury 
Accident in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-29 (1953 as amended) 
Trial Transcript, 237 (hereinafter "T. Tr.11). 
A car accident occurred at the intersection of 900 East and 
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5600 South on the Van Winkle expressway. Britt McGrath's car was 
in the northbound lane when it was struck by a "white truck" making 
a left-hand turn onto Van Winkle. Ms. Mcgrath's car was propelled 
into the back of Letecia Epple's car. Both cars ended up in the 
middle of the intersection. T. Tr. 21. Both women suffered 
injuries in the accident. T. Tr. 21, 29. 
Mr. Strausburg was arrested in the early morning hours of May 
6, 1993. A police officer with Granite School District, David 
Richards (hereinafter "Richards") heard a bulletin from the 
sheriff's office that they were trying to locate "a vehicle that 
had been involved in a hit-and-run accident on Van Winkle. The 
description was a white diesel-type tractor pulling a red flatbed 
trailer." T Tr. 38. Richards spotted the vehicle at 3300 South and 
500 East. Id. He approached the cab and talked to the occupants. 
When Sergeant Mohler (hereinafter "Mohler") arrived, Richards left. 
T. Tr. 43. Mohler examined the truck and noticed white transfer 
paint on the trailer of the vehicle. T. Tr. 50. This vehicle 
matched the description Mohler had been given at the scene of the 
accident. Mohler then turned the scene over to three other 
deputies--Deputy Mortensen, Deputy Wooten, and Deputy Paul 
Christensen. T. Tr. 54. 
Mohler approached the cab of the vehicle to talk to the 
occupants. The driver, Brant Strausburg, was told that there had 
been an accident on Van Winkle and the people in the other cars had 
been injured. T. Tr. 56-57. At this point, Mr. Strausburg was not 
formally put under arrest for a DUI, but he was the prime suspect 
4 
in the hit-and-run accident and was not free to leave. T. Tr. 63. 
Without mirandizing the defendant, Mohler elicited information from 
Mr. Strausburg that he had come from Wasatch Boulevard, headed down 
to 3300 South until he reached 500 East. T. Tr. 55. After further 
questioning, Strausburg admitted to being at the scene of the 
accident on Van Winkle. Deputy Mohler did not testify about any 
odor of alcohol coming from the cab or the occupants or that he 
suspected Mr. Strausburg had been drinking. 
Deputy David Mortensen (hereinafter "Mortensen") arrived at 
the scene and briefly talked to Richards and Mohler. When 
Mortensen contacted Strausburg, he noticed the odor of alcohol and 
that his speech was "slightly slurred, but he was understandable." 
T. Tr. 72. Mortensen asked Strausburg to perform some field 
sobriety tests. T. Tr. 70. Mr. Strausburg informed the officer 
that he had a back problem. T. Tr. 103. 
The first field sobriety test Mortensen asked Strausburg to 
perform was the "finger count" test. Mortensen said, "I asked him 
to start on his pinkie with his thumb as an indicator and count 
one, two, three, four, four, three, two, one. I asked him to touch 
tip to tip, and I asked him to do the test three times. Then I 
demonstrated it, one, two, three, four, four, three, two, one; one, 
two, three, four, four, three, two, one; one, two, three, four, 
four three, two, one. I then asked him if he understood the test 
and to start the test." T. Tr. 74. Strausburg never miscounted or 
double tapped a finger. Strausburg did not touch his fingers tip 
to tip and performed the test one more time than asked. Based on 
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that, the officer said Strausburg failed the test. T. Tr. 75-76. 
The second test he was asked to perform was the "one-legged 
stand". Mortensen asked Strausburg to keep his hands at his side 
and lift one leg three to six inches off the ground, extend his 
toes, and keep his knee locked while looking hat his foot. He was 
asked to count from 1,001 to 1,015. Mortensen looked for hopping, 
if Strausburg used his arms for balance, if he put his foot down, 
or if he stopped the test. According to Mortensen, Strausburg put 
his foot down at 'five.' He restarted the test and finished with 
perfect compliance. Mortensen failed Strausburg because he put his 
foot down once. T. Tr. 77. 
The next test given was the "heel to toe" test. Strausburg 
was asked to walk a line, heel to toe, with his hands to his sides. 
He was asked to take seven steps up, rotate and return nine steps. 
Commenting on his performance, Mortensen stated, "I believe he used 
his arms for balance, had a hard time balancing. Other than that 
I didn't notice any other signs." T. Tr. 78. 
Strausburg was also asked to do an "alphabet" test. The 
instructions were to say the alphabet twice, starting with 'B' and 
ending with 'S'. Strausburg did the test exactly as asked by 
Mortensen. However, on the second time through the alphabet, he 
started with the letter 'A' rather than the letter 'B' . T. Tr. 82 
On cross-examination, Mortensen admitted that Strausburg's 
balance was good and that he has seen people do a lot worse on the 
field sobriety tests than Strausburg did. T. Tr. 93-97. 
The final test Strausburg was ordered to perform was the 
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horizontal gaze nystagmus test (hereinafter "HGN"). Mortensen held 
a stimulus, in this case a pen, 12 to 15 inches in front of Mr. 
Strausburg's eyes.1 He then slowly moved the pen across Mr. 
Strausburg's filed of vision "until the eyes cannot move further to 
the side." T. Tr. 80, 1984 NHTSA Study, 3. 
Mortensen was looking for three things as he administered the 
HGN test: (1) the angle of onset of nystagmus2 in each eye, T. Tr. 
80, 1984 NHTSA Study, 4; (2) lack of smooth pursuit, T. Tr. 81, 
1984 NHTSA Study, 4; and (3) the presence of nystagmus at maximum 
deviation, (i.e., when the eye is moved as far as possible to one 
side), T. Tr. 80, 1984 NHTSA Study, 4. 
Mortensen did not mention his training in HGN although he 
alluded to HGN training in D.R.E. (drug recognition expert) school. 
T. Tr. 66, 99. His other training consisted of 40 hours per year 
in "law enforcement related" topics. T. Tr. 65 
Mortensen did not testify that he has any scientific degrees, 
1
 The procedures for administering the HGN are outlined in 
two National Highway Traffic Safety Administration publications: 
Tharp, Burns, Moskowitz, Development and Field Test of 
Psychophysical Tests for DWI Arrests, U.S. Dep't of Transportation, 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Office of Driver 
and Pedestrian Research, DOT-HS-8-01970 (March 1981) (hereinafter 
"1981 NHTSA Study"); (2) Improved Field Sobriety Testing, U.S. 
Dep't of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, DOT HS 806 512 (January 1984)(hereinafter "1984 
NHTSA Study"). 
2
 Nystagmus is an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball, 
which may be horizontal, vertical or rotary." Dorland's 
Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1068 (25th ed. 1974) . Nystagmus 
"may be present at rest, or it may occur with eye movement." 
McCance & Huether, Pathophysiology: The Biologic Basis for Disease 
in Adults and Children, 415 (C.V. Mosby 1990) . 
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or scientific expertise in the fields of neurology, ophthalmology, 
chemistry, physiology, or any subject showing how alcohol might 
affect the human body. No testimony by Mortensen explains the 
cause of nystagmus or the underlying cause or relationship between 
alcohol ingestion and nystagmus. Mortensen did, however, 
acknowledge that nystagmus is caused by substances other than 
alcohol and that some people in the population exhibit natural 
nystagmus. T. Tr. 101-102. He knew that nystagmus can be caused 
by syphilis, measles, brain injury, epilepsy, eye muscle fatigue, 
drugs and certain diseases. T. Tr. 99-101. Mortensen did not 
testify how he was able to distinguish alcohol nystagmus from other 
forms of nystagmus or if he was able to. 
Mortensen stated that the angle of lateral deviation must be 
estimated. "It depends on the person and their build. I can't 
say, yeah, it would be exact on every person" T. Tr. 81. This 
presents a problem with the accuracy and consistency of the HGN 
result. He also acknowledged that there are disagreements in the 
scientific community about the angle of onset of nystagmus, that 
some consider it 51 degrees, while others consider the onset to be 
at 30 or 35 degrees. T. Tr. 101. Mortensen uses a 45 degree 
angle. Mortensen did not use a template, as recommended by the 
NHTSA, to determine the angle of onset, but rather estimated the 
angle from practice. T. Tr. 81. 
Mortensen concluded that Mr. Mortensen's eyes showed "a lack 
of swift pursuit" and there was a noticeable nystagmus at the 45 
degree onset. T. Tr. 81. 
8 
Mr. Strausburg challenged the State's use of HGN arguing that 
1) the test is not an inherently reliable scientific test, and 2) 
the officer administering the test was not qualified as an expert 
to administer the test or to interpret the results. The court 
denied Mr. Strausburg's Motion to Exclude the HGN. 
After the last field sobriety test, Mortensen placed Mr. 
Strausburg under arrest. T. Tr. 83. Mr. Strausburg did not submit 
to a chemical test. T. Tr. 85. There was therefore no evidence of 
Mr. Strausburg's blood alcohol content (hereinafter "BAC"). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The HGN test results are scientific evidence and must meet the 
admissibility requirements of Utah Rule of Evidence 702. The 
police officer was not qualified to validate the scientific 
principles supporting the relationship between alcohol ingestion 
and nystagmus because he had no medical degrees or scientific 
training of any kind. As a result, the officer was not qualified 
to administer the HGN. 
The HGN test is unreliable. Recent scientific literature 
disputes the accuracy and reliability of the HGN results because 
there is disagreement about the angle of onset of nystagmus and 
because officers do not properly conduct the HGN test, making the 
results unreliable. 
The defendant was not given Miranda warnings prior to being 
questioned by the police. He was questioned while seated in the 
cab of the truck in the presence of several officers. As such, he 
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was in police custody and should have been given proper warnings 
before being interrogated. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING HGN TEST RESULTS, 
A. THE HGN TEST RESULTS ARE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND MUST MEET THE 
ADMISSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 702, AND THE 
INHERENT RELIABILITY STANDARD ARTICULATED BY THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT. 
(1) THE HGN TEST 
Nystagmus is one of three types of abnormal ocular movements3 
defined as "an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball, which may 
be horizontal, vertical, rotary, or mixed." Dorland's Illustrated 
Medical Dictionary 1068 (25th ed. 1974), see also McCance & 
Huether, supra, at 415. In horizontal or "jerk" nystagmus "one 
phase of the eye movement is faster than the other." McCance & 
Huether, supra, at 415. 
HGN was first used by law enforcement in California in the 
late 1960's to identify persons suspected of barbiturate 
consumption. See generally Ludington, Impaired Driving: HGN Test, 
60 ALR 1129, 1131; 1981 NHTSA Study; Tenney, The Horizontal Gaze 
Nystagmus Test and Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, New 
Hampshire Bar Journal, 1 Vol. 27:3, 180 (Spring 1986) . "The theory 
behind the gaze nystagmus test is that there is a strong 
3
 The other two types of abnormal ocular movements are 
strabismus and paralysis of individual extraocular muscles. 
McCance & Huether, supra at 415. The primary symptom of strabismus 
is double vision. Strabismus is caused by a "weak or hypertonic 
muscle in one of the eyes." .Id. Trauma, cranial nerve pressure, 
and various diseases may cause paralysis of specific extraocular 
muscles. The primary symptom of paralysis of specific extraocular 
muscles is drooping of the eye. Id. 
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correlation between the amount of alcohol a person consumes and the 
angle of onset of the nystagmus." State v. Witte, 83 6 P.2d 1110, 
1112 (Kan. 1992) (quoting Carper & McCamey, Gaze Nystagmus: 
Scientific Proof of DUI?, 77 111. B.J. 146, 147 (1988)). Most 
people, however, will exhibit some nystagmus or jerking as their 
eyes track to the extreme side. Witte, 836 P.2d at 1112 (citing 
1983 NHTSA Study). 
The 1984 NHTSA Study outlines the procedures for administering 
the HGN. The officer should first ask the suspect to remove 
glasses or hard contact lenses. 1984 NHTSA Study, at 3 . A suspect 
is then ordered to keep his head still and to follow the stimulus -
- usually a pen, flashlight, or the officer's finger -- with his 
eyes only. Icl. The officer then moves the stimulus across the 
suspect's field of vision until the eye moves to the extreme side. 
Id. The 1984 NHTSA Study recognizes that some suspects will move 
their heads4; the officer is thus instructed to use a flashlight 
or his free hand for a chin rest. Id. 
When conducting the HGN, the officer looks for three signs in 
each eye: (1) angle of onset occurring before 45 degrees in each 
eye;5 (2) ability of the eye to follow the moving object 
4
 Head movement will affect the officer's estimation of angle 
of onset, thus affecting the result of the test. See Rouleau, 
Unreliability of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test, 4 Am Jur Proof 
of Facts 3d 439. For that reason, the 1984 NHTSA Study requires 
officers learning how to conduct the HGN to use a template when 
determining the angle of onset. 1984 NHTSA Study, at 3. 
5
 An angle of onset of 45 degrees or less is said to 
correlate to a blood alcohol content (hereinafter "BAC") of .10. 
1981 NHTSA Study at 82-83, R. 283-84. NHTSA contends that the 
sooner the angle of onset, the higher the BAC. Several recent 
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smoothly;6 and (3) the presence of moderate or distinct nystagmus 
when the eye is moved as far as possible to the side. 1984 NHTSA 
Study at 4. If the officer finds four of the possible six clues, 
then he can "classify [the suspect's] [blood alcohol content] BAC 
as above .10 percent." Id. 
(2) THE HGN TEST AND ITS RESULTS ARE BASED ON SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES 
The large majority of the jurisdictions considering the 
admissibility of HGN test results have found the test to be based 
on scientific principles. State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 1110, 1116 
(Kan. 1992) (The HGN test is based upon scientific principles and 
exceeds common knowledge); State v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d 171, 
178 (Ariz. 1986) ("The HGN test is a different type of test from 
balancing or walking a straight line because it rests almost 
entirely upon an assertion of scientific legitimacy rather than a 
basis of common knowledge."); Ex Parte Malone, 575 So. 2d 106, 107 
(Ala. 1990) (admission of HGN without showing test's reliability or 
scientific basis upon which it is based rendered admission of test 
results reversible error); People v. Williams, 3 Cal. App. 4th 
studies question the reliability of the 45 degree angle of onset. 
See generally Pangman, Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus: Voodoo Science, 
2 DWI Journal 1, 2 (1987) (citing Toglia, Electronystagmography: 
Technical Aspects and Atlas (1976)) (50%-60% of sober individuals 
will exhibit nystagmus indistinguishable from alcohol nystagmus 
when deviating eyes more than 4 0 degrees to the side) ; Rouleau, 
supra at 453 (citing recent studies demonstrating lack of 
correlation between angle of onset and predicted BAC). 
6
 The 1984 NHTSA Study instructs the officer to "be sure that 
the jerkiness was not due to your moving the object in a jerky 
manner." 1984 NHTSA Study at 4. 
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1326, 1334, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 130 (1992)) (conclusion drawn from HGN 
results based on knowledge, training, and experience which was 
clearly beyond common experience); Commonwealth v. Miller, 367 Pa. 
Super. 359, 365-66, 532 A. 2d 1186 (1987) (expert testimony required 
to establish adequate foundation regarding results of police 
officer's interpretation of HGN); State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 
881, 811 P.2d 488 (1991); State v. Armstrong, 561 So. 2d 883, 887 
(La. App.) writ denied 568 So. 2d 1077 (La. 1990); State v. 
Wheeler, 764 S.W. 2d 523, 524-25 (Mo. App. 1989); State v. 
Borchardt, 224 Neb 47, 58-59, 395 N.W. 2d 551 (1986); People v. 
Torrev, 144 A.D. 2d 865, 866, 534 N.Y.S. 2d 807 (1988); State v. 
Reed, 83 Or.App. 451, 454-55, 732 P.2d 66 (1987); State v. Barker, 
179 W. Va. 194, 197-98, 366 S.E. 2d 642 (1988); State v. Clark, 
234 Mont. 222, 762 P.2d 853 (1988); State v. Grier, 791 P.2d 627, 
631 (AK App. 1990). 
The large majority of jurisdictions require that a Frye 
standard (Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) or 
similar guarantee of trustworthiness be demonstrated before 
admitting the test into evidence. See e.g.. State v. Superior 
Court, 718 P. 2d at 179 (Ariz 1986) (proponent of HGN must 
demonstrate that scientific principle has gained general acceptance 
in scientific community, "subject to a foundational showing that 
the expert was qualified, the technique was properly used, and the 
results were accurately recorded.")7 
7
 Three states hold that HGN is not Scientific Evidence: 
State v. Bresson, 51 Ohio St. 3d 123, 129, 554 N.E. 2d 1330 
(Ohio 1990) (HGN different from other scientific tests such as 
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(3) THE FRYE STANDARD IN UTAH 
The trial court found that the HGN was a scientific test 
subject to the admissibility requirements of Utah Rule of Evidence 
702 and the Philips inherent reliability standard, see Philips v. 
Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1230 (Utah 1980) ; Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398 
(Utah 1989). Rule 702 states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of opinion or otherwise. 
While rule 702 is the general rule for admissibility of 
scientific evidence, "where expert testimony is based upon novel 
scientific principles or techniques, courts have long imposed 
additional tests of admissibility that antedate the [rules of 
evidence]." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396. The purpose for imposing 
a more restrictive test for judging the admissibility of scientific 
evidence, as a threshold matter, is to insure that only reliable 
evidence go to the finder of fact. The court noted the danger of 
admitting unproven scientific principles: 
One danger being guarded against is the tendency of the finder 
of fact to abandon its responsibility to decide the critical 
issues and simply adopt the judgment of the expert despite an 
inability to accurately appraise the validity of the 
Polygraph because no special equipment required. Officer must 
establish knowledge of test, training, and ability to interpret 
observations for test to be admissible) . State v. Murphy, 451 
N.W.2d 154, 156 (Iowa 1990) (Iowa adopts liberal approach to 
admissibility of technical information -- unnecessary to establish 
foundation for HGN evidence through scientific testimony); and 
Finlev v. State, 809 S.W. 2d 909, 913-14 (Tex. App. 1991) (HGN 
admissible through lay or expert witness to prove intoxication, but 
may not be used to prove exact BAC). 
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underlying science. 
Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d at 396. HGN is a novel scientific principle or 
technique. See e.g., Witte, 836 P.2d at 1116. 
In Philips, 615 P.2d at 123 0, the Utah Supreme Court outlined 
the standard for admissibility of novel scientific evidence noting 
first the paradigm case in the field, Frye v. United States, 293 F. 
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Court, in quoting Frye, stated: 
scientific tests still in experimental stages should not be 
admitted in evidence, but that scientific testimony deduced 
from a 'well recognized scientific principle or discovery' is 
admissible if the scientific principle from which the 
deduction is made is 'sufficiently established to have gained 
general acceptance in the particular field in which it 
belongs.' 
Philips, 615 P.2d at 1233 (quoting Frye, 293 F. at 1014) . 
The court went on to articulate a standard of admissibility 
termed "inherent reliability" which maintains the basic framework 
of the Frye standard: 
Tests that have passed from the experimental stage may be 
admissible if their reliability is reasonably demonstrable. 
An analysis of the admissibility of scientific evidence, while 
taking into account general scientific acceptance and 
widespread practical application, must focus in all events on 
proof of inherent reliability. 
Philips, 615 P.2d at 1234 (citations omitted). 
The admissibility of scientific evidence may be presented in 
two different ways: (1) a request that the trial court take 
judicial notice of the inherent reliability of the testimony's 
foundational principle; or (2) a request for an evidentiary hearing 
where evidence is presented in support or against the claim of 
inherent reliability. Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d at 398. In the first 
instance, judicial notice, the proponent must demonstrate "a very 
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high level of reliability . . . " before a court may take judicial 
notice of the test's scientific reliability. Ld. Kofford v. Flora, 
744 P.2d 1343, 1348 (Utah 1987) (scientific scholars in relevant 
field unanimously agree that HLA paternity test is reliable). 
Under Philips, Kofford, and Rimmasch, the proponent of 
scientific evidence that is not suitable for judicial notice must 
make an initial foundational showing that the principles or 
techniques underlying the proffered testimony meet the standard of 
inherent reliability. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398. In the absence of 
such an initial showing the evidence is excluded. .Id. In either 
case, once the threshold requirement for inherent reliability is 
established, the court must still determine if the offered evidence 
is helpful to the trier of fact. JEd. at 398 n. 4. (trial court 
required to balance probativeness of proffered evidence against 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING THE RESULTS OF THE HGN TEST 
WITHOUT REQUIRING THE CITY TO PRESENT EXPERT TESTIMONY REGARDING 
THE INHERENT RELIABILITY OF THE TEST 
The State presented no expert testimony regarding the inherent 
reliability of the HGN test within the relevant scientific 
community. And, there is no basis that the court should take 
judicial notice of the HGN's inherent reliability. R. 109. The 
relevant field of qualified experts remains largely undefined. 
Compare Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 191-92 (recognizing behavioral 
psychology, highway safety, neurology, and criminologists as 
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relevant scientific field); Grier, 791 P. 2d at 629 (neurologist and 
pathologist comprise relevant scientific field for determining 
reliability of HGN for limited purpose of probable cause to 
arrest); Williams, 5 Cal Rptr. 3d at 133, 135-36 (supervisor of 
forensic alcohol analysis and drug section of state crime could not 
offer expert testimony on reliability of HGN test because of 
widespread disagreement within the scientific community). 
Furthermore, the studies and cases standing alone are insufficient 
to allow the court to take judicial notice. See Philips, 615 P. 2d 
at 1236 (articles submitted by proponent of paternity test not 
sufficient, in absence of expert testimony, to determine as matter 
of law that paternity test has achieved general acceptance in 
scientific community) ; Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d at 3 98 ("very high level 
of reliability is required before judicial notice can be taken."); 
State v. Reed, 83 Or. App. 451, 732 P.2d 66, 69 (Or. App. 1987) 
(error for trial court to take judicial notice of HGN test 
reliability in absence of expert testimony). 
The only evidence presented to establish the inherent 
reliability of the HGN would have to come from arresting officer 
Mortensen who lacks the specialized scientific training to testify 
about the test's scientific reliability. See Williams, 5 Cal Rptr. 
at 134 (arresting officer not qualified to give expert opinion that 
suspect's nystagmus was caused by alcohol consumption); State v. 
Barker, 366 S.E.2d 642, 645 (W. Va. 1988) (error to admit HGN when 
only testimony was from arresting officer whose testimony consisted 
of defining HGN and explaining how he conducted test); State v. 
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Borchardt, 395 N.W.2d 551, 559 (Neb. 1986) (arresting officer, who 
received training through police-sponsored seminar, not qualified 
to testify as expert witness to verify reliability of test); 
Commonwealth v. Miller, 367 Pa. Super. 359, 532 A.2d 1186, 1189-90 
(testimony from officer who participated in two day HGN training 
course insufficient to establish foundation for test's admission); 
Middleton v. State, 780 S.W.2d 581 (Ark. App. 1989) (testimony of 
arresting officer alone unable to establish reliability and general 
acceptance of HGN); State v. Reed, 83 Or. App. 451, 732 P.2d 66, 69 
(Or. App. 1987) (Officer who had received in-service training for 
HGN and conducted test over 100 times in field not qualified as 
expert to testify regarding reliability of HGN test). 
Mortensen did not testify that he possessed special scientific 
training in neuro-physiology or ophthalmology (medical fields 
familiar with neurological malfunction of smooth eye tracking 
patterns caused by alcohol or other neurological causes which may 
result in nystagmus); pharmacology and toxicology (medical fields 
familiar with the physical, emotional, and physiological effect of 
alcohol and drugs); or behavioral psychology (effects of alcohol on 
the movement of the eye) . See e.g. , Miller, 532 A. 2d at 1189-90 
(non-scientific police training insufficient to qualify officer as 
scientific expert). 
The California Court of Appeals explained the problem of 
allowing police officers with no scientific expertise to state 
their opinion regarding the relationship between alcohol ingestion 
and HGN: 
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[HGN] rests on scientific premises well beyond [the 
officer's] knowledge, training, or education. Without some 
understanding of the processes by which alcohol ingestion 
produces nystagmus, how strong the correlation is, how other 
possible causes might be masked, what margin of error has been 
shown in statistical surveys, and a host of other relevant 
factors, his opinion on causation, notwithstanding his ability 
to recognize the symptom, was unfounded. 
Williams, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 13 5. 
In sum, police officers lack the scientific training and 
expertise necessary to validate the scientific principles upon 
which the HGN is premised. Although a police officer may testify 
as to his observations, those observations do not validate the 
underlying scientific principle. Hearsay statements learned in 
police school regarding the HGN's reliability are unquestionably 
insufficient to establish the scientific foundation mandated by 
Philips. Accordingly, the State must produce expert testimony, 
other than line officers, to establish the inherent reliability of 
the HGN test. See Philips, 615 P.2d at 1236 (laboratory technician 
who completed basic workup on paternity blood tests not qualified 
to testify with respect to scientific validity of test). 
C. THE HGN TEST IS NOT INHERENTLY RELIABLE 
(1) The Correctness of The Principles Underlying The Test 
In State v. Witte, 836 P. 2d at 1121, the Kansas Supreme Court 
found that n[t]he reliability of the HGN test is not currently a 
settled proposition in the scientific community." It concluded 
that HGN did not meet the foundational requirements for 
admissibility of scientific evidence. id. at 1119. More 
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importantly, the court reviewed a number of recent scientific 
articles that question the scientific reliability of the HGN test8 
and which recognize division within the scientific community 
regarding the reliability of the HGN test. See Williams, 5 Cal. 
Rptr. at 133 (relevant scientific community "disagree on the 
accuracy and reliability of the HGN test for identifying alcohol 
impairment."). 
(2) Accuracy and Reliability of Methods Utilized in Applying HGN 
Officer Mortensen relied on information learned in D.R.E. 
school, which looks to the NHTSA in determining the degree of angle 
when the onset of nystagmus will be evident. NHTSA identifies a 45 
degree angle of lateral deviation as the crucial point for 
estimating a BAC of .10. 1984 NHTSA Study at 3-4. Even NHTSA 
concedes that officers using the 45 degree angle of onset 
incorrectly estimate BAC 22% of the time. 1981 NHTSA Study at 25-
30. One other study concludes that as many as 50% to 60% of sober 
individuals who deviate their eyes more than 40 degrees to the side 
will exhibit a form of nystagmus indistinguishable from alcohol 
nystagmus. Pangman, supra at 2 (citing Toglia, 
Electronystagmography: Technical Aspects and Atlas (1976)). 
8
 Those articles include Cowan & Jaffe, Proof and Disproof of 
Alcohol-Induced Driving Impairment Throucrh Evidence of Observable 
Intoxication and Coordination Testing, 9 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 
459 §12 (1990); Pangman, Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus: Voodoo 
Science, 2 DWI Journal 1, 3-4 (1987); Rouleau, Unreliability of 
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test, 4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 43 9 § 
7, p. 452 (1989); 1 Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases §§ 8A:06, 
8A:08 (3d ed. 1992); 2 Nichols, Drinking/ Driving Litigation § 
26:01 (1991 & Supp. 1992). 
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Another study contradicts the NHTSA findings and instead concludes 
that a lateral deviation of 40% correlates to a BAC of .06. 
Pangman, supra at 2 (citing Aschan, Different Types of Alcohol 
Nystagmus, Acta Otolaryngologica Supp. 14 0:69 (1957) and Aschan, 
Bergstedt, Goldberg & Laurell, Positional Nystagmus in Man During 
and After Alcohol Intoxication, 17 Q.J. of Studies on Alcohol 381 
(1956)). Still another study concludes that individuals with a 
purported BAC of .10 do not exhibit nystagmus until the eye is 
deviated to a 51 degree angle. Pangman, supra at 2 (citing Lehti, 
The Effect of Blood Alcohol Concentration on the Onset of Gaze 
Nystagmus, 13 Blutalkohol 411 (1976)). Mortensen was aware of 
disagreement in the scientific community about the accuracy of the 
45 degree angle of onset. T. Tr. 101. 
At least one law enforcement agency concluded that "there was 
virtually no correlation between the actual value of blood alcohol 
concentration and the predicted value based upon the angle of onset 
of nystagmus." Rouleau, supra at 453 (citing Norris, The 
Correlation of Angle of Onset of Nystagmus With Blood Alcohol 
Level: Report of a Field Trial, 25 (No. 6) Journal of Forensic 
Science Society 476 (1985). Although the study found a correlation 
between the breath alcohol reading and angle of onset of nystagmus, 
the author concluded that the BAC prediction was influenced by the 
officer's prior knowledge of the subject's breath test result. The 
testing officers were incorrect approximately 50% of the time when 
blood was taken because BAC results were not known prior to 
administering the HGN test. Simply put, the testing officers were 
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able to manipulate the HGN results when they knew an actual BAC 
from the breath testing, but could not come close to the correct 
BAC prior to learning the results of the blood test. Rouleau, 
supra at 453. 
(3) Effect of Variables that Influence Accuracy of Test 
Mortensen admitted that several variables affect the accuracy 
of the test. He was aware that diseases, including the measles, 
cause nystagmus, as well as epilepsy, head injury, syphilis and eye 
strain can all cause nystagmus. T. Tr. 99-100. He did not testify 
how he was able to distinguish alcohol nystagmus from other forms 
of nystagmus or if he was able to make that distinction at all. 
Recent scientific studies expand the list of factors that may 
cause nystagmus: 1. problems with inner ear labyrinth; 2. 
irrigating ears with warm or cold water; 3. influenza; 4. 
streptococcus; 5. vertigo; 6. measles; 7. syphilis; 8. 
arteriosclerosis; 9. muscular dystrophy; 10. multiple sclerosis; 
11. Korsakoff's syndrome; 12. brain hemorrhage; 13. epilepsy; 
14. hypertension; 15. motion sickness; 16, sunstroke; 17. eye 
strain; 18. eye muscle fatigue; 19. glaucoma; 20. changes in 
atmospheric pressure, Pangman, supra at 3; 21. poor light 
conditions, Rouleau, supra at 456; 22. nicotine, id. at 455; 
23. caffeine, id. at 455; 24. Aspirin, id. at 455; 25. 
antihistamines, id. at 455; and 26. circadian rhythms. Id. See 
also Williams, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 136 (State's forensic alcohol 
expert "readily admitted that many other factors can be responsible 
[for HGN] and could lead to a 'false positive'11). Mortensen was 
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either unaware of these scientific articles, was unqualified to 
interpret the scientific literature, or was simply disingenuous 
about the existence of other causes of HGN. 
(4) Establishing that the Test Performed in this Case was 
Performed in Accordance with Proper Procedures and with Proper 
Materials and Equipment. 
Mortensen acknowledged that the angle of lateral deviation 
must be estimated. T. Tr. 81. Failure to properly estimate the 
angle present [s] a problem with the accuracy and consistency of the 
HGN result. Because determination of the angle of onset is such a 
sensitive measurement, the NHTSA in its HGN studies and others 
conducting HGN research use a mechanical device to anchor the head 
in a stable position. 1981 NHTSA Study at 6, 16; see Lehti, supra, 
13 Blutalkohol 411, Aschan, supra Supp. 140:69. Angular 
measurements were then obtained through the use of protractors to 
precisely measure the angle of onset. 1981 NHTSA Study at 16. 
In contrast to laboratory procedures, a roadside test 
administered by a police officer has no mechanical device to ensure 
that the suspect's head does not move. The field officer simply 
instructs the suspect to "Keep your head still."9 1984 NHTSA Study 
at 3. It is difficult to conceive that even a sober person could 
maintain his head in a perfectly fixed position without the use of 
a mechanical device. Maintaining a fixed position becomes 
increasingly unlikely when the suspect is nervous, T. Tr. at 76, 
9
 NHTSA also instructs the officer to use a flashlight or his 
free hand for a chin rest if the suspect moves his head. 1984 
NHTSA Study at 3. 
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and was visually and vocally distracted by State Street traffic and 
people who were yelling and screaming. T. Tr. 151. Additionally, 
police officers in the field are unlikely to perceive subtle head 
movements which may affect the accuracy of the test since even 
subtle head movement will render the results of the HGN test 
invalid for determining the suspect's level of intoxication. 
D. THE ADMISSION OF THE HGN RESULTS STATEMENTS WAS PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL. 
"In order to constitute reversible error, the error complained 
of must be sufficiently prejudicial that there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant in its 
absence." State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In the instant case, no breath test evidence was available at 
trial. Mr. Strausburg's vehicle was not weaving or swerving. The 
driving conditions were treacherous. It was raining and "very 
slick". T. Tr. 61, 19, 57, 132, 170. Sergeant Mohler commented 
that he would not drive that intersection if it were wet because it 
was so dangerous. T. Tr. 61. Not only that, but Mr. Strausburg 
was trying to negotiate a left-hand turn coming off of a hill in an 
eighteen wheel truck. T. Tr. 20, 57, 133. Sergeant Mohler 
attributed the accident to the trailer of the truck jackknifing 
"because it's going downhill and it's wet, and the trailer will 
slide out behind him." Mohler responded "yes" when asked if he 
felt the accident happened because the "brakes were applied and the 
road was slick." T. Tr. 59 
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The driving pattern here was not necessarily consistent with an 
intoxicated driver, but poor road conditions in a vehicle that 
requires precision and skill to operate. Much more is needed to 
establish that the driving pattern is the result of intoxication. 
See State v. Borchardt, 395 N.W. 2d 551 (Neb 1986) (dangerous and 
erratic driving almost causing accident, inadequate performance on 
Field Sobriety Tests, admission to drinking, slurred speech, and 
Prosecutors's statement in opening that Defendant's BAC was .18 
make admission of HGN harmless error); Commonwealth v. Miller, 532 
A. 2d 1186, 1190 (Pa. Super. 1987) (Admission of HGN harmless error 
in light of other evidence showing that Defendant was involved in 
accident, drove away from police at excessive speed, went through 
stop sign, drove over curb, fought with police, failed all field 
sobriety tests, had slurred speech, and odor of alcohol). 
Mr. Strausburg and his passenger both testified that they did 
not feel the impact of the accident. T. Tr. 134, 170. Strausburg 
stated that he "definitely" would have stopped if he had known he 
were in an accident. T. Tr. 170. Defense witness Walter L. Aires, 
who has driven trucks similar to the one driven by Strausburg for 
40-45 years, testified that it was very possible to be in the kind 
of accident Strausburg was involved in without even being aware of 
it. T. Tr. 152. In those weather conditions with that size of 
vehicle, Aires said it would be very possible to not feel the 
impact of the accident. T. Tr. 152-153. He mentioned a time when 
he was in a serious accident without being aware of it. Id. 
The first officer at the scene, David Richards, testified to 
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an odor of alcohol coming from the cab of the truck (T. Tr. 42) , 
however on cross examination, Richards admitted that degree of 
intoxication could not be determined from odor of alcohol. T. Tr. 
44. Sergeant Mohler, who elicited damaging statements from the 
defendant, did not mention any odor of alcohol coming from the 
truck, Strausburg or the passenger. And he never mentioned that 
they appeared intoxicated. 
It is hard to believe that the third officer, Mortensen, 
suddenly noticed an odor of alcohol which Mohler could not detect 
while talking to Strausburg just moments earlier. T. Tr. 72. His 
speech was only "slightly" slurred" and "he was understandable". 
Id, Even though Strausburg admitted to having four beers in the 
last hour and a half (T. Tr. 87), Trooper Zdunich testified that 
Strausburg's BAC would be only a .027 using the Widmark formula. 
T. Tr. 118. 
Finally, Mr. Strausburg's performance on the other field 
sobriety tests was graded subjectively and is just as consistent 
with someone who was not intoxicated. People are nervous when 
asked to perform field sobriety tests, especially when immediately 
prior to taking the tests, one has been told that he or she has 
caused an accident in which people were injured and taken to the 
hospital as occurred here. T. Tr. 56. 
Actually, Strausburg performed very well on all of the field 
sobriety tests. On the "finger-count" test, Mortensen stated that 
Strausburg never missed a finger or miscounted. He also stated 
that he has seen subjects do a lot worse on this test than 
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Strausburg. T. Tr. 94. The only reason for failing Strausburg on 
this test was that he did not touch his fingers exactly tip-to-tip 
and he performed the test one more time than asked. T. Tr. 75-76. 
On the "one-legged stand" test, Strausburg never lifted his 
hands for balance. Mortensen said he failed Strausburg on this 
test for putting his foot down once. However, Strausburg restarted 
the test and performed it perfectly. T. Tr. 77. Also, the officer 
knew that Strausburg had a bad back and that a bad back can affect 
performance on this test. T. Tr. 95. Again, Mortensen admitted 
that he has seen people do this test a lot worse than Strausburg 
did. T. Tr. 95. 
On the "walk-and-turn" test, Strausburg performed this test 
perfectly. He walked up seven steps heel-to-toe and returned nine 
steps in the same manner. Mortensen felt that he had "a hard time 
balancing. Other than that I didn't notice any other signs." T. 
Tr. 78. 
Strausburg did well on the "alphabet test" as well. He was 
asked to say the alphabet twice, starting with 'B' and ending with 
'S'. This test was performed perfectly except that on the second 
time through, he started with the letter 'A' rather than ' B'. T. 
Tr. 82. 
The officer also mentioned that these field sobriety tests do 
not necessarily indicate degree of impairment. He has witnessed 
persons with very high BAC levels, yet they perform well on the 
field sobriety tests. And, he has seen subjects with very low BAC 
levels who perform very poorly on these field sobriety tests. T. 
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Tr. 104, 110. 
Because Strausburg performed so well on the field sobriety 
tests and because the tests' unreliability in predicting degree of 
intoxication, it is likely that the jury gave a lot of weight to 
the HGN test and determined that he was intoxicated based on this 
test alone. The court's admission of the HGN test was therefore 
not harmless error, and Mr. Strausburg should be granted a new 
trial. 
Strausburg stated that he did not feel the effects of the 
alcohol and did not feel that he was under the influence of 
alcohol. T. Tr. 179. In the absence of the HGN, there is a 
reasonable likelihood the jury would have acquitted Mr. Strausburg. 
See Witte, 836 P.2d at 1121 (admission of HGN reversible error by 
leading jury to believe that result supported Intoxilyzer reading); 
Ex Parte Malone, 575 So. 2d at 107 ("The problem created by 
improper admission of the HGN evidence is due to the scientific 
nature of the test and the disproportionate impact it might have 
had on the jury's decision-making process."). Indeed the admission 
of HGN here is the kind of evidence likely "to distort the fact-
finding process by reason of its superficial plausibility and its 
potential for inducing fact finders to accept experts' judgments on 
critical issues rather than making their own." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 
399. The critical issue is whether Mr. Strausburg was impaired and 
unable to safely operate his vehicle because he was under the 
influence of alcohol. If the jury considered the remaining 
evidence, absent the HGN, it is likely that the jury would have 
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reached * different result. See Witte, 83£ P ?d at .1. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS 
WITHOUT GIVING PROPER MIRANDA WARNINGS AND FAILURE TO GIVE THESE 
WARNINGS WAS NOT HARMLESS ERROR, 
"The prosecur ;c: •.-* - r*t:a^  °rr>^ m s \ emitting from 
custodial interrogat 10: < r the dt:iu::act:: - • . ^strafe? the 
use c: ^afeauards effective - < uie L^e pi 1 " 1 lege 
against self - incr imin.-;» . .- .ranJa ^ Arizona, 3 84 U. S . 43 6, 
, 60 S.V* ' ~ . ~: * - 1^ I. r-.d.Jd 694 -. i I •- "defendant 
c in ousijuij in being interrogated by r^ie pc-iice.-, Miranud 
warnings must be given. 
"Custodial interrogation" refers to "guer. • \ at-:d h^ 
law enforcem* - ••*•'. rc: after H person has t>— r; takei 11.LO .JLJL; :; 
otherwise depiivec; * r : r - — significant 
^ '^ "
 : tate v. Snydei , 8 f 0 f / d * b i , o *>,..;.. ' :^:^  
Miranda, - 80 S . C L . «.W .• * * 
INTERROGATION 
" :terroqat i-'^ n' refers not only to express -:.^ -si .. *uu 
also to a:;: ,-. . * he part r.j ; he oclice tnat 
the police should Know <*H --a^-. '. ., •-- \ o elicit an 
i - a^4-ir:-: response rion; the suspect * . ,
 t , uon ^ , L > A r agon, 
813 t „c ... . .>. V — "o. M; 
Mr. cr.rausbuty was ^ ^
 s„. ^-ress i nterroaat ion by Officer 
J Anhj Mohler aprreached \ he . *ah of th*- . LL...- the 
occupants a::-. • ' r--^ L' • n^r mat :ned the descrip; xoi, of 
t ^ one involved 11 a:i accj.ae;. Boulevard. _. _1r. 
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49-52. He observed transfer paint on the right side of the trailer 
of the truck which was consistent with damage that would have 
occurred in the Van Winkle accident. T. Tr. 50. The nature of the 
conversation he had with Mr. Strausburg was " [t]o ascertain whether 
or not he was involved in this accident on 9th East and Van 
Winkle." T. Tr. 55. 
In response to this inquiry, Strausburg incriminated himself 
by making the comment that he was not at the scene of the accident, 
but rather he was on Wasatch Boulevard. Id. After further 
interrogation, Strausburg admitted to being at the scene of the 
accident when it occurred. T. Tr. 56. Because Strausburg was 
charged with LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN INJURY ACCIDENT, these 
statements were damaging. They suggest that Strausburg lied about 
being at the scene because he knew he caused the accident but 
decided to leave anyway. This information was crucial to the 
state's case as it establishes an element of the crime of LEAVING 
THE SCENE OF AN INJURY ACCIDENT. 
B. CUSTODY 
Not only must a person be subject to interrogation by the 
police, but he or she must also be in police custody before Miranda 
warnings are triggered. The person need not be formally arrested, 
but his or her freedom of movement must be restricted to the degree 
of a formal arrest. State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1104 (Utah 
App.1991). The standard is an objective one, or whether a 
reasonable person in the same circumstances would not feel free to 
leave. Id. 
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In Salt Lake City v . Carnei , 6'4 P ^d ^ 1 ^ Q , "_ 
the Utaii SUL-• i--*- if led lou: 'actwrs 10 consider 
determining whether, a person _ i — f " m a : arrest, 
a-: .. ^ j i e slt:uation IT; Strausburg The racial ^  ar- .....3 
of iuierrogat . L LUC -uv^stiqation focused on the 
accused whether in- objective ir.-j -• 5~ rres^nt ; 
lena*- r -n- form of interrogation ic ^La.. ^^p„>n-e 
Coui\. lcatt^rmc: *inc, : r1 Stat e ^ ...Wood, 868 P. 2d 70 
(Utah 1993 - --r.nps r:. t h- O,..L .. :• . :: 
:>- ^^fend^nt- came t^ - «• he place or ,:;tenogation tieeiy 
diu willingly, bampbu. 
Srrausudia A-,.— . LeiiugaLed ^' n; : . . .. - ) ui 
the second facto . Strausburg wa^ not 
only the focus c; .:.•;-. . ^ -.-^ «: L nohle*1' stated that t>- was 
the prime suspec* liu-ana-1 un accr: ::-.-u; ' 3. 
T-.-mh-:- : w^9 ri« *t formally placed under arrest before 
the conversation, iw... .1 ;-L,^-- . ' '• JUS.I ;r.i wi;-! n^t fr^e 
leave and that h^ would have chased J.in. 3 ^  , ,. n. 
Tr. 63. 
The real question, _J u : -. »
 a "xeas-^nable person 
[i'nd^ r- the same circumstances] would Lt^, h^ was n. - . 1 -j-
a . • •- unst ionira * Sampson a: . « , quoting People 
v. Algien, i6w ^ u,- • ; \en banc* *^ the 
time "f the questioning there were at i--a^ ; four of . •_ 
scene (. "^ -> ten, Christensen, *i. 1 •' ^hlei 
Mohler informed otiausburg of the seriousness of the accident and 
stating that people were injured and in the hospital. T. Tr. 56. 
Under these conditions, a reasonable person would not feel free to 
disregard the officer's questions and leave. 
As to factor four, the form of the questioning has been an 
important consideration. When investigatory questioning turns to 
accusatory questioning, custody is likely and Miranda warnings 
become essential. Carner at 1170. Questioning becomes accusatory 
when the police reasonably believe a crime has been committed and 
that the defendant committed it. Id. at 1171. 
Even before approaching the cab of the truck, Mohler had 
reason to believe that the occupant committed a crime. The truck 
matched the description of the vehicle given at the accident scene 
and when Mohler first arrived, he examined the truck and noticed 
transfer paint on the trailer of the truck. T. Tr. 50. As 
Strausburg was the prime suspect for the Van Winkle accident, the 
police should have given Miranda warnings before questioning him. 
Lastly, as to factor five, Mr. Strausburg did not come to the 
place of questioning willingly, but rather the officer approached 
him for questioning. Mohler did not testify that he informed 
Strausburg that he was free to leave without answering his 
questions. 
Strausburg incriminated himself by stating that he was not at 
the scene of the accident, but rather that he was on Wasatch 
Boulevard. T. Tr. 55. After further interrogation, Strausburg 
admitted to being at the scene of the accident when it occurred. T. 
Tr. 56. Because Strausburg was charged with LEAVING THE SCENE OF 
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CAUSi; I ' -'••-~,,r-#--- - •• - o^~- ]c° were 
damaging ney suggest, thai; Strausburg : ;-.-.u , ••_. ± t:l 1 5 
scene because he K-I^V) ••••• was intoxicated, and ; na: •:- caused the 
accident - _ :- - " nformatir^ wa^ crucial 
to t:i-r state's case as it establishes an clement" ^: •-. .£ 
LEAVING THE SCENE ^" Z1-" INJURY ACCIDENT. If Strausburg had been 
properly warned ;. . : JU«-. i •• ~n v nave 
rendered verdict :: 'uo: qu.,:y -.-.: • \ .^.\-.. jnarge. 
Ther^r ^roductioii of these statements is i eversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant as;_ . s 
sc:ent:fc:c evidence subject t i ! hf iiineierc re;jdbii;iy test, ,-hat 
•* -•" *
 {
 >' : " i^a ! i f i ed t(. validate the scientific 
principles suppoil.iiq ;:.•.: ie:a; : • • :, :. u- ; .. * j;qe- >n 
and nystagmus ; L ii&f 2 - •*- ir. so i ent J f i c ] 11 erat are demonstrate the 
. - r . i • vidence; that adr^iss-'^i <-o '-he HGN result 
:.:i this case was .tveisibb error; ti.. xiiajia > *- .. J.-
ia,;e Deen oiven :-.; M: . Strausburg before questioning him; and that 
. .,. -'• iM-irv.j ' was reversible error. 
DATED this __ ; ;•« •- 4. 
Susanne Gustin 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
tion — Color of light signal — Inopera-
tive traffic-control signals. 
D (a) Green, red, and yellow are the only colors 
that may be used in traffic-control signals, except 
for special pedestrian signals that may use white 
and orange. 
(b) Traffic-control signals indicate and apply 
to operators of vehicles and pedestrians as pro-
vided in this section. 
2) (a* (i) Except as provided in Subsection fiii ve-
hicular traffic facing a circular green signal 
may: 
(A) proceed straight through the in-
tersection; 
(B) turn right; or 
(C) turn left. 
(ii) Vehicular traffic facing a circular 
- reen s ignal , including vehicles turning 
ight or left: 
(A) shall y ie ld the right-of-way to 
other vehic les and to pedestrians law-
fully w i th in the intersection or an adja-
cent crosswalk at the t ime the signal is 
exhibited; and 
(B) ma y not turn right or left if a sign 
at the intersection prohibits the turn 
(b) Vehicular traffic facing a green arrow sig-
nal shown alone or in combination with other 
indication: 
(i) may caut ious ly enter the intersection 
only to m a k e the movement indicated by the 
arrow or other indication shown at the same 
t ime; and 
(ii) shal l y ie ld the right-of-way to pedes-
trians lawful ly within an adjacent crosswalk 
and to other traffic lawfully us ing the inter-
section. 
(c) Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-
control s ignal under Section 41-6-25, pedestrians 
facing any green s ignal other than a green turn 
arrow may proceed across the roadway within 
any marked or unmarked crosswalk. 
(3) (a) Vehicular traffic facing a steady circular 
yel low or yel low arrow s ignal is warned that th^ 
al lowable movement related to a green signal i# 
be ing terminated. 
(b) Unles s otherwise directed by a pedestrian-
control s ignal under Section 41-6-25, pedestrians 
facing a steady circular ye l low or yeUow arrow 
s ignal are advised that there is insufficient t ime 
to cross the roadway before a red indication is 
shown, and a pedestrian may not start to cross 
the roadway. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(c), ve-
hicular traffic facing a steady circular red or red 
arrow signal: 
(i) may not enter the intersection unless 
entering the intersection to make a move-
ment permitted by another indication; and 
(ii) shall stop at a clearly marked stop 
l ine, but if none, before enter ing the marked 
or unmarked crosswalk on the near side of 
the intersection and shall remain stopped 
until an indication to proceed is shown. 
(b) Unles s otherwise directed by a pedestrian-
control s ignal under Section 41-6-25, pedestrians 
facing a steady red signal alone may not enter 
the roadway. 
(c) (i) Except when a s ign is in place prohibit-
ing a turn, vehicular traffic facing any 
from a one-way street into a one-way street, 
after stopping as required by Subsection 
( 4 K B ) . 
(ii) The vehicular traffic shall yield the 
right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully within 
an adjacent crosswalk and to other traffic 
lawfully us ing the intersection. 
(5) (a) This section applies where an official traf* 
fic-control signal i s erected and maintained at an 
intersection or at a place other than an intersex 
tion. 
(b) Any stop required shall be made at a sign 
or marking on the h ighway pavement indicating 
where the stop shall be made, but, in the absent* 
of any sign or marking, the stop shal l be made i t 
the signal 
(6) The operator of a vehicle approaching an inter-
section that h a s an official traffic-control signal that 
is inoperative shall stop before enter ing the intersec-
tion and shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle as 
required under Section 41-6-72. 1MI 
41-6-25. Special pedestrian-control signals — 
Meaning of signals — Rights and do* 
ties. 
When special pedestrian-control signals exhibiting 
the words "Walk" or "Don't Walk" or symbols of 
"Walking Person" or "Upraised Palm" are in plact, 
the signals indicate: 
(a) Flashing or steady "Walk" or symbol of 
"Walking Person" means a pedestrian facing tht 
signal may proceed across the roadway in tht 
direction of the signal and the operators of ill 
vehicles shall yield the right-of-way to him. ,( 
(b) Flashing or steady "Don't Walk" e f 
"Upraised Palm" means a pedestrian may not 
start to cross the roadway in the direction of tht 
signal, but a pedestrian who has partially eoim 
pleted his crossing on the walk signal shall pro^ 
ceed to a sidewalk or safety island while tht 
"Don't Walk" or "Upraised Palm" signal is shofs, 
ing 1M? 
S 26, Flashing red or yellow signals — Right! 
and duties of operators — Railroad 
grade crossings excluded. I 
(1) When an i l luminated f lashing red or yellow aif* 
- a l i s used in a traffic s ignal or with a traffic alga, 
ehicular traffic shal l obey it as follows-
(a) Flashing red stop signal* When a red signal: 
is illuminated by rapid intermittent flashes, ot>j 
erators of vehicles shall stop at a clearly marM 
stop line, but if none, before entering the croaK 
walk on the nearest side of the intersection, or If 
none, then at a point nearest the intersedJaf * 
roadway where the operator has a view of taw 
proaching traffic on the intersecting roadway bt* 
fore entering The right to proceed is subject It 
the rules applicable after making a stop at a attp 
sign ' 
(b) Flashing yel low caution signal: When I 1 
yellow signal is i l luminated with rapid intermit^ 
t en t flashes, operators of vehicles may procmi, 
through the intersection or past the signal otfy 
with caution 
(2) This section does not apply at railroad f r t t V 
crossings. Provisions regarding vehicles approachJaii 
railroad grade crossings are under Section 41-6-95; 
vidual lanes , the s igna l s indicate and apply to opera-
tors of vehicles a s follows: 
(1) Green signal — vehicular traffic may 
travel in any lane over which a green signal is 
shown. 
(2) Steady yel low s ignal — vehicular traffic is 
warned that a lane control change i s be ing made. 
(3) Steady red s ignal — vehicular traffic may 
not enter or travel in any lane over which a red 
signal is shown 
(4) Flashing yellow signal — vehicular traffic 
may use the lane only for the purpose of ap-
proaching and making a left turn twi 
41-6-27. Prohibition of unauthorized signs, sig-
nals, lights or markings — Commercial 
advertising — Public nuisance — Re 
moval. 
(1) A person m ay not place, mainta in , or display 
upon or in view of any h ighway any unauthorized 
lign, s ignal , l ight, marking, or device which purports 
to be or is an imitat ion of or resembles an official 
traffic-control device or railroad s ign or s ignal , or au-
thorized emergency vehicle f lashing l ight , or which 
(a) at tempts to direct the movement of traffic, 
(b) hides from v iew or interferes wi th the effec-
t iveness of any official traffic-control device or 
any railroad s ign or signal; or 
(c) which is of such bril l iant i l lumination and 
so positioned as to blind or dazzle an operator or 
any adjacent h ighway. 
(2) A person may not place or mainta in nor ma% 
any public authority permit upon any h ighway any 
traffic s ign or s ignal bearing on it any commercial 
advertising except for bus iness s igns included as part 
of official motorist service panels approved by the De-
partment of Transportation. This provision does not 
prohibit the erection upon private property adjacent 
to highways of s igns g iv ing useful directional infor-
mation and of a type that may not be mis taken f c 
official s igns 
(3) Every prohibited sign, signal, or light, or mark 
ing is declared to be a public nuisance and the au-
thority having jurisdiction over the highways ma% 
remove it or cause it to be removed without notice 
41-6-28. Interference with signs and signals 
prohibited. 
A person may not without lawful authority attempt 
to or in fact alter, deface, injure, knock down, or re-
move any official traffic-control device or any railroad 
•ign or signal or any inscription, shield, or insignia 
On it, or any other part of it iw? 
ARTICLE 4 
ACCIDENTS 
414-29. Operator's duty at accident — Stop at 
accident — Penalty. 
(1) The operator of a vehicle involved in an acci-
eVnt resulting in injury to or death of any person 
•hall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the 
accident or as close to it as possible and shall immedi-
ately return to and remain at the scene of the acci-
itnt until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 
41*6-31. The stop may not obstruct traffic more than 
k necessary. 
misdemeanor. u 
41-6-30. Accidents involving damage to vehlc 
or property — Stop at accident. 
The operator of a vehicle involved in an accide 
resulting only in damage to a vehicle or other pro 
erty which is operated or attended by any perso 
shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of tl 
accident or as close to it as possible, and shall imm 
diately return to and remain at the scene of the ac« 
dent until he has fulfilled the requirements of Sectii 
41-6-31. The stop may not obstruct traffic more thi 
is necessary it 
41-6-31. Accident involving Injury, death, < 
property damage — Duties of operate 
occupant, owner. 
CI) The operator of a vehicle involved in an ac< 
dent resulting in injury to or death of any person 
damage to any vehicle or other property, if the vel 
cle or other property is operated, occupied, or t 
tended by any person or if the owner of the vehicle 
property is present, shall: 
(a) give to the person*? involved his name, a 
dress, and the registration number of the vehi< 
he is operating; 
(b) upon request and if avai lable , exhibit 1 
operator's l icense to 
(i) any invest igat ing peace officer presei 
(ii) the person struck; 
(iii) the operator, occupant of, or pers 
attending the vehicle or other property dai 
aged in the accident; and 
(iv) the owner of property damaged in t 
accident, if present; and 
(c) render to any person injured in the collisi 
reasonable ass istance, including the transpo 
ing, or the m a k i n g of arrangements for the trai 
porting, of the person to a physician, surgeon, 
hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it 
apparent that treatment is necessary or if t 
transporting is requested by the injured perse 
(2) The operator of a vehicle involved in an ac 
dent result ing in injury to or death of any person 
property damage to an apparent extent of $750 
more shall immediate ly and by the quickest means 
communication avai lable give not if e of the accide 
to the nearest office of a law enforcement agenc 
(3) If the operator of a vehicle is physically incai 
ble of g iv ing an immediate notice of an accident 
required in Subsect ions (1) and (2) and there is t 
other occupant in the vehicle at the t ime of the ac 
dent capable of g iv ing an immediate notice, *b* . »•< 
pant shall g ive or cause to be given the n. 
quired of the operator under this section. 
(4) If the operator is physically incapable of m* 
ing a written report of an accident when requii 
under Section 41-6-35 and he is not the owner of t 
vehicle, then the owner of the vehicle involved in t 
accident shall within 15 d**ys after becoming awarr 
the accident make the report required of the opera 
under this section. I 
41-6-32. Collision with unattended vehicle 
other property — Duties of operati 
The operator of a vehicle which collides with or 
involved in an accident with any vehicle or otl 
property which is unattended and which results 
damage to the other vehicle or property shall imme 
ately stop and either locate and notify the operator 
owner of the vehicle or th*» nwnor nf ntV»m- nconoH* 
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cal control of a motor vehicle while having alcohol in 
the blood or while under the influence of alcohol or 
any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug, or that governs, in relation to any of those 
matters, the use of a chemical test or chemical tests, 
or evidentiary presumptions, or penalties, or that 
governs any combination of those matters, shall be 
consistent with the provisions in this code which gov-
ern those matters. 
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that 
governs reckless driving, or operating a vehicle in 
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons 
or property shall be consistent with the provisions of 
this code which govern those matters. 1987 
41-6-43.10. Repealed. 1985 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs, or with specified or unsafe 
blood alcohol concentration — Mea-
surement of blood or breath alcohol — 
Criminal punishment — Arrest with-
out warrant — Penalt ies — Suspension 
or revocation of l icense — Penalties. 
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this state if 
the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentra-
tion of .08 grams or greater as shown by a 
chemical test given within two hours after 
the alleged operation or physical control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any 
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree that renders the 
person incapable of safely operating a vehi-
cle, 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violat-
ing this section is or has been legally entitled to 
use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of 
blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall 
be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of 
breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time 
of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury 
upon another as a proximate result of 
having operated the vehicle in a negli-
gent manner; or 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of 
age in the vehicle at the time of the of-
fense. 
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence 
is that of simple negligence, the failure to exer-
cise that degree of care that an ordinarily reason-
able and prudent person exercises under like or 
similar circumstances. 
(c) In this section, a reference to this section 
includes any similar local ordinance adopted in 
compliance with Section 41-6-43 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court 
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a manda-
tory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive 
hours nor more than 240 hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, 
reauire the w»rnnn M i»««-if •« - ~«— SA 
(c) (i) In addition to the jail sentence or com-
munity-service work program, the court 
shall order the person to participate in an 
assessment and educational series at a li-
censed alcohol or drug dependency rehabili-
tation facility, as appropriate. 
(ii) For a violation committed after July I, 
1993, the court may order the person to ob-
tain treatment at an alcohol or drug depen-
dency rehabilitation facility if the licensed 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation fa-
cility determines that the person has a prob-
lem condition involving alcohol or drugs. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violation 
committed within six years of a prior violation 
under this section the court shall as part of any 
sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not 
less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than 
720 hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, 
require the person to work in a community-ser-
vice work program for not less than 80 hours nor 
more than 240 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or commu-
nity-service work program, the court shall order 
the person to participate in an assessment and 
educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropri-
ate. The court may, in its discretion, order the 
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drag 
dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed 
within six years of two prior violations under tail 
section is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor except as pro-
vided in Subsections (ii) and (7); and b ; 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of tat 
prior convictions are for violations commit- \ 
ted after April 23, 1990. * . 
(b) (i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall 
as part of any sentence impose a mandatory , 
jail sentence of not less than 720 nor mora 
than 2,160 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative it 
jail, require the person to work in a comma-
nity-service work program for not less thai, 
240 nor more than 720 hours 11 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or eon- j 
munity-service work program, the court
 r 
shall order the person to obtain treatment t t ' 
an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation \ 
facility, as appropriate. #^ 
(c) (i) Under Subsection (a)(ii) the court shall ' 
as part of any sentence impose a fine of not • 
less than $1,000 and impose a mandatory j t l ' 
sentence of not less than 720 hours nor mora * 
than 2,160 hours. v*| 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative If 
jail, require the person to work in a commo> ; 
nity-service work program for not less thtfj 
240 nor more than 720 hours, but only If tat 
court enters in writing on the record the rot* j 
son it finds the defendant should not sen*" 
the jail sentence Enrollment in and comple-
tion of an alcohol or drug dependency reha-
bilitation program approved by the court 
may be a sentencing alternative to incarcer-
ation or community service if the Droffrul ii 
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(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or com-
munity-service work program, the court 
shall order the person to obtain treatment at 
• an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility. 
(7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a vio-
, lation committed within six years of the prior 
, violations under this section is a third degree fel-
i ony if at least three prior convictions are for vio-
, lations committed after April 23, 1990. 
, (b) The court shall as part of any sentence im-
pose a fine of not less than $1,000 and impose a 
, mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 
hours nor more than 2,160 hours. 
i% (c) (i) The court may, as an alternative to jail, 
I require the person to work in a community-
service work program for not less than 240 
nor more than 720 hours, but only if the 
court enters in writing on the record the rea-
t son it finds the defendant should not serve 
the jail sentence. 
(ii) Enrollment in and completion of an al-
cohol or drug dependency rehabilitation pro-
gram approved by the court may be a sen-
1 tencing alternative to incarceration or com-
munity service if the program provides in-
1
 tensive care or inpatient treatment and long-
' term closely supervised follow through after 
* the treatment. 
r
 ' (d) In addition to the jail sentence or commu-
nity-service work program, the court shall order 
,
f
 the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or 
h
 drug dependency rehabilitation facility. 
1
 (8) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence re-
•? quired under this section may not be suspended 
t and the convicted person is not eligible for parole 
or probation until any sentence imposed under 
& this section has been served. Probation or parole 
* resulting from a conviction for a violation under 
\< this section may not be terminated 
'*) (b) The department may not reinstate any Ii-
p cense suspended or revoked as a result of the con-
lf, viction under this section, until the convicted 
+ person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the 
t department that: 
fc (i) all required alcohol or drug dependency 
f / assessment, education, treatment, and reha-
(^ bilitation ordered for a violation committed 
^ after July 1, 1993, have been completed; 
/ (ii) all fines and fees including fees for res-
L titution and rehabilitation costs assessed 
i against the person have been paid, if the con-
L viction is a second or subsequent conviction 
^ for a violation committed within six years of 
k a prior violation; and 
f! (iii) the person does not use drugs in any 
r abusive or illegal manner as certified by a 
licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabili-
*
!
 tation facility, if the conviction is for a third 
1
 or subsequent conviction for a violation corn-
el mitted within six years of two prior viola-
tions committed after July 1, 1993 
f(9) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), 
j* (6), and (7) that require a sentencing court to 
I order a convicted person to* participate in an 
assessment and educational series at a li-
lt censed alcohol or drug dependency rehabili-
1
 tation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the 
#» court •*»•*••"«•* -*• — • 
combination of those things, apply to a cc 
viction for a violation of Section 41-6-45 th 
qualifies as a prior conviction under Subsc 
tion (10). 
(ii) The court shall render the same ord 
regarding education or treatment at an ale 
hoi or drug dependency rehabilitation faci 
ity, or both, in connection with a first, se 
ond, or subsequent conviction under Sectio 
41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior convictio 
under Subsection (10), aB the court woul 
render in connection with applying respet 
tively, the first, second, or subsequent cor 
viction requirements of Subsections (4), (5 
(6), and (7). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a con 
viction under Section 41-6-45 that qualified as i 
prior conviction under Subsection (10), is a first 
second, or subsequent conviction under this sub 
section, a previous conviction under either this 
section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a prioi 
conviction. 
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilita-
tion program and any community-based or other 
education program provided for in this section 
shall be approved by the Department of Human 
Services. 
(10) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea 
of guilty or no contest to a charge of a viola-
tion of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance en-
acted under Section 41-6-43 in satisfaction 
of, or as a substitute for, an original charge 
of a violation of this section, the prosecution 
shall state for the record a factual basis for 
the plea, including whether or not there had 
been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a com-
bination of both, by the defendant in connec-
tion with the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of 
the facts that shows whether there was con-
sumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination 
of both, by the defendant, in connection with 
the violation. 
(b) (i) The court shall advise the defendant be-
fore accepting the plea offered under this 
subsection of the consequences of a violation 
of Section 41-6-45 as follows. 
(ii) If the court accepts the defendant's 
plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of 
violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor 
states for the record that there was consump-
tion of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant in connection with 
the violation, the resulting conviction is a 
prior conviction for the purposes of Subsec-
tions (5), (6), and (7). 
(c) The court shall notify the department of 
each conviction of Section 41-6-45 that is a prior 
offense for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), 
and (7). 
( I D A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest 
a person for a violation of this section when the offi-
cer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the offi-
cer has probable cause to believe that the violation 
was committed by the person 
(12) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall* 
date of the prior violation 
(b) The department shall subtract from any 
suspension or revocation period the number of 
days for which a license was previously sus-
pended under Section 53-3-223, if the previous 
suspension was based on the same occurrence 
upon which the record of conviction is based. I»M 
41-6-44,1, Procedures —- Adjudicative proceed-
ings. 
The Department of Public Safety shal with 
the procedures and requirements of TitI apter 
46b, in its adjudicative proceedings imi 
41-6-44.2. Repealed. less 
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analy-
sis — Evidence. 
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public 
Safety shall establish standards for the administra-
tion and interpretation of chemical analysis of a per-
son's breath, including standards of training 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is mate-
rial to prove that a person was operating or in actual 
physical control of a vehicle while under the influ-
ence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood 
or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, docu-
ments offered as memoranda or records of acts, condi-
tions, or events to prove that the analysis was made 
and the instrument used was accurate, according to 
standards established in Subsection (1), are admissi-
ble if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the 
regular course of the investigation at or about 
the time of the act, condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made 
and the method and circumstances of their prepa-
ration indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established 
under Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection 
(2) have been met, there is a presumption that the 
test results are valid and further foundation for intro-
duction of the evidence is unnecessary tm~ 
41-6-44.4. Person under 21 may not operate ve 
hide with detectable alcohol in bod? 
— Chemical test procedures — Tempo 
rary license — Hearing and decision 
Suspension of license or operatinj 
privilege — Fees — Judicial review. 
fl^ (a) As used in this section "local substanc 
abuse authority" has the same meaning as pre 
vided in Section 62A-8-101 
(b) Calculations of blood, breath, or urine alcr 
hoi concentration under this section shall h^ 
made in accordance with the procedures in Sufc 
section 41-6-44(2). 
(2) (a) A person younger than 21 years of age ma^  
not operate or be in actual physical control of a 
vehicle with any measurable blood, breath, or 
urine alcohol concentration in his body as shown 
by a chemical test, 
(b) (i) A person with a valid operator license 
who violates Subsection (a), in addition to 
any other applicable penalties arising out of 
the incident, shall have his operator license 
denied or suspended as provided in Subsec 
tion (ii). 
(ii) (A) For a first ofTense under Subset 
tion (a), the Driver License Division of 
the Department of Public Safety shal1 
tion for a period of 90 days beginning on 
the 30th day after the date of the arrest 
under Section 32A-12-209. 
(B) For a second or subsequent ofTense 
under Subsection (a), within three yeart 
of a prior denial or suspension, tht 
Driver License Division shall suspend 
the person's operator license for a period 
of one year beginning on the 30th day 
after the date of arrest. 
fc) (i) A person who has not been issued an 
operator license who violates Subsection (a), 
in addition to any other penalties arising out 
f^ the incident, shall be punished as provided 
n Subsection (ii). 
(ii) For one year or until he is 17, which-
ever is longer, a person may not operate • 
vehicle and the Driver License Division maf 
not issue the person an operator license or 
learner's permit. 
3) (a) When a peace officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a person may be violating 
or has violated Subsection (2), the peace officer 
may, in connection with arresting the person for 
a violation of Section 32A-12-209, request that 
the person submit to a chemical test or tests to be 
administered in compliance with the standards 
under Section 41-6-44 10. 
(b) The peace officer shall advise a person 
prior to the person's submission to a chemical 
test that a test result indicating a violation if 
Subsection (2)(a) will result in denial or suspen-
sion of the person's license to operate a motor 
vehicle or a refusal to issue a license. 
(c) If the person submits to a chemical test and 
the test results indicate a blood, breath, or urine 
alcohol content in violation of Subsection (2MaX 
or if the officer makes a determination, based Oft 
reasonable grounds, that the person is otherwise 
in violation of Subsection (2)(a), the officer direct* 
ing administration of the test or making the de-
termination shall serve on the person, on behalf 
of the Driver License Division, immediate notice 
of the Driver License Division's intention to deaf 
or suspend the person's license to operate ft ?eM» 
cle or refusal to issue a license under Subsection. 
(2). k 
(4) When the officer serves immediate notice en 
ehalf of the Driver License Division, he shall.' 
(a) take the Utah license certificate or perms* 
if any, of the operator; 
(b) issue a temporary license certificate efleft* 
tive for only 29 days if the driver had ft Vftftf 
operator's license; and 
(c) supply to the operator, on a form to be ftf> 
proved by the Driver License Division, bask it* 
formation regarding how to obtain ft procsfl 
hearing before the Driver License Division. 
(5) A citation issued by the officer may, if approves) 
as to form by the Driver License Division, serve ftlftf 
as the temporary license certificate under SubeecUnl 
(4Kb) 
(6) The peace officer serving the notice shall seal 
to the Driver License Division within five daya ftftftf 
the date of arrest and service of the notice: 
(a) the person's driver license certificate, f 
anj *< 
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the ofietMl 
WDV i c o u i u j , i i c a u j , a u u 
(d) any other basis for the officer's determina-
tion that the person has violated Subsection (2). 
(7) (a) (i) Upon written request, the Driver Li-
cense Division shall grant to the person an 
opportunity to he heard within 29 days after 
the date of arrest under Section 32A-12-209. 
(ii) The request shall be made within ten 
days of the date of the arrest. 
(b) A hearing, if held, shall he before the 
Driver License Division in the county in which 
the arrest occurred, unless the Driver License Di-
vision and the person agree that the hearing may 
be held in some other county. 
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall 
cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable 
grounds to believe the person was operating 
a motor vehicle in violation of Subsection 
(2)(a); 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit 
to the test; and 
(iii) the test results, if any 
(d) In connection with a hearing the Driver Li 
cense Division or its authorized agent may ad 
minister oaths and may issue subpoenas for the 
attendance of witnesses and the production of rel 
evant books and papers. 
(e) One or more members of the Driver Licence 
Division may conduct the hearing 
(f) Any decision made after a hearing before 
any number of the members of the Driver Li 
cense Division is as valid as if made after a hear 
ing before the full membership of the Driver Li 
cense Division 
(g) After the hearing, the Driver License Divi 
aion shall order whether the person 
(i) with a valid license to operate a mote 
vehicle will have his license denied or not o 
suspended or not; or 
(ii) without a valid operator license will be 
refused a license under Subsection (2)(c) 
(h) If the person for whom the hearing is held 
fails to appear before the Driver License Division 
fts required in the notice, the division shall order 
whether the person shall have his license denied, 
suspended, or not denied or suspended, or 
whether an operator license will be refused or not 
refused 
(8) (a) Following denial or suspension the Driver 
License Division shall assess against a person, ir« 
addition to any fee imposed under Subsection 
63-3-205(14), a fee under Section 53-3-105, which 
shall be paid before the person's driving privilege 
Is reinstated, to cover administrative costs This 
fee shall be canceled if the person obtains an un 
appealed Driver License Division hearing or 
court decision that the suspension was not 
proper. 
(b) A person whose operator license has been 
denied, suspended, or postponed by the Driver 
License Division under this section may file a 
petition within 30 days after the suspension for a 
hearing on the matter which, if held, is governed 
by Section 53-3-224 
9) After reinstatement of an operator license for a 
Ant offense under this section, a report authorized 
•ftder Section 53-3-104 may not contain evidence of 
1M denial or suspension of the person's operator li-
Vslftt under this section if he has not been convicted 
41-12a-412 do not apply to a denial or suspenjatef 
imposed for a first offense under this section # # < 
denial or suspension is based solely on a violation o 
Subsection (2)(a). 
(11) (a) In addition to the penalties in SubRectioi 
(2), a person who violates Subsection (2)(a) shal 
be referred by the Driver License Division to th 
local substance abuse authority for an assess 
ment and recommendation for appropriate at 
tion. 
(b) (i) Reinstatement of the person's operate 
license or the right to obtain an operator 1 
cense is contingent upon successful comph 
tion of the action recommended by the locf 
substance abuse authority 
(ii) The local substance abuse authority 
recommended action shall be determined h 
an assessment of the person's alcohol abus 
and may include: 
(A) a targeted education and prevei 
tion program; 
(B) an early intervention program, < 
(C) a substance abuse treatment pr 
gram. 
(iii) Successful completion of the recor 
mended action shall be determined by stai 
dards established by the Division of Su 
stance Abuse 
(c) At the conclusion of the penalty period ir 
posed under Subsection (2), the local substan 
abuse authority shall notify the Driver Licen 
Division of the person's status regarding compl 
tion of the recommended action. 
(d) The local substance abuse authorities shi 
cooperate with the Driver License Division i 
(i) conducting the assessments; 
(ii) making appropriate recommendatio 
for action; and 
(iii) notifying the Driver Licence Divisi 
about the person's status regarding comp 
tion of the recommended action 
(e) (i) The local substance abuse authority 
responsible for 
(A) the cost of the assessment of t 
person's alcohol abuse; and 
(B) for making a referral to an app 
priate program on the basis of the fii 
ings of the assessment 
fii) (A) The person who violated Subs 
tion (2)(a) is responsible for all costs s 
fees associated with the recommenc 
program to which the person is referr 
(B) The costs and fees under Subs? 
tion (A) shall be based on a sliding sc 
consistent with the local substai 
abuse authority's policies and practi 
regarding fees for services ] 
41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test resi 
in actions for driving under the inl 
ence — Weight of evidence. 
tl) (a) In any civil or criminal action or proceed 
in which it is material to prove that a person ' 
operating or in actual physical control of a vi 
cle while under the influence of alcohol or dr 
or with a blood or breath alcohol content st* 
torily prohibited, the results of a chemical tes 
tests as authorized in Section 41-6-44 10 are 
missible as evidence 
